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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
COMPENSATION TO LANDOWNERS FOR PROPERTY
LYING WITHIN LIMITS OF ANCIENT TURNPIKES,
UPON CHANGE IN TRAVELED WAY
ROBERT T. DONLEY*
It is common knowledge that the State of West Virginia
is crossed and recrossed with public highways which, in the
earlier history of the state, were established as turnpikes,
under the authority of the Virginia legislature. Many of
these ancient highways, if not all of them, have lost their
character as turnpikes, and have been maintained for years
simply under the broad, but rather vague name of "county
roads." Indeed, apparently only the oldest citizens of the
state remember when these highways were once toll-roads,
and the majority of the people are unaware of their histori-
cal significance. But aside from their historical and geo-
graphical interest, these old turnpikes present legal prob-
lems which apparently have never been solved in this state,
but upon the solution of which, turn public and private
rights of manifest importance.
The situation proposed for examination is shortly this:
an ancient turnpike was established by legislative authority,
and secured a right of way, (or it may be fee simple title,)
for the road, which was sixty feet in width. Years passed,
the turnpike company became extinct, and the highway
was never improved more than thirty feet in width. Prop-
erty owners for many years conveyed titles to lands abutting
upon the turnpike, with reference to a thirty-foot right of
way, and the original sixty-foot way was apparently for-
gotten. In the year 1927, either the county court or the
State Road Commission, as the classification of the road
may require, attempts to widen the old road and to assert
a forty-foot right of way, without paying the landowner
for the land so taken, upon the theory that such land is
public property included within the limits of the ancient
sixty-foot right of way of the turnpike.
Such a situation presents several questions of law, not all
* Member of Monongalia Vounty Bar, 'Vest Virginia.
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of which can be discussed within the limits of this paper,
but the most important of which, it is submitted, are those
of the nature and extent of the public right in highways;
whether those rights may be lost or forfeited; if so, in what
manner; the immunity of public corporations, or states,
from the doctrines of adverse possession, prescription, estop-
pel, and the statute of limitations.
In the year 1817, the General Assembly of the Common-
wealth of Vrginia passed a law entitled, "An Act Prescrib-
ing Certain General Regulations for the Incorporation of
Turnpike Companies."'  The first clause stipulated that:
i * * * * the following general provisions shall be
deemed and taken to be part of the said charter or act
of incorporation, to the same effect as if the same were
expressly re-enacted in reference to any such charter or
act, except so far as such special grant, charter or act
may otherwise expressly provide; viz: * * * *
It was further provided that:
"If the president and directors cannot agree with the
owner of the land, on the terms upon which the road
shall be opened through it, it shall be lawful for them to
apply to the court of the county in which such land, or
the greater part thereof, may lie; and, * * * * it shall
be the duty of the court to appoint five * * * * free-
holders, to assess the damages, to such land, which will
result from opening the said road through it."
After reciting that the viewers should go upon the land, the
statute directed that:
" * * * they shall take into consideration the quantity
and quality of the land which the road will occupy, the
additional fencing which will be required thereby, and
all other inconveniences which will result to the said land
from the opening of the said road, and shall combine
therewith a just regard to the advantage which the own-
er of the land will derive from the opening of the road
through the same."
Apparently, therefore, the viewers were to consider general
benefits resulting from the opening of the road, contrary
to the present rule limiting the set-off to special or peculiar
1 REvisEI CODE OF THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1819, Vol. II, pp. 211-225.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1927], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss1/4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
benefits. But the most pertinent part of this statute, for
present purposes, is Section 14,2 wherein it is directed:
"That the president and directors shall construct
bridges over all water courses crossing the said road,
where the same shall be found necessary, and shall make
the said road in every part thereof, sixty feet wide at
least * * * * "
As bearing upon the question of whether the turnpike cor-
poration would acquire an easement, or a fee simple in the
land taken for highway purposes, the statute is rather am-
biguous, and declares:
"In consideration of the expenses the proprietors will
incur in opening, improving, and repairing the said road,
the said road, with all the tolls and profits, shall be, and
the same is hereby vested in the respective proprietors
forever, in proportion to their respective shares; and the
same shall be deemed personal estate, and shall be ex-
empt from any public charge or tax whatsoever."
However, the interest of the company might be forever lost
by failure to keep the road in repair for the period of
eighteen months. That various turnpikes throughout the
commonwealth and in what is now the State of West Vir-
ginia, were incorporated in pursuance of this law, there
seems to be no doubt, and much positive proof.3 In the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, the courts would undoubt-
edly hold that where a turnpike was incorporated and the
highway laid out under the authority of such a statute, the
presumption is that the statute was complied with;4 and
therefore that the road was sixty feet wide at the least.
Assuming that such sixty-foot way was acquired in the
manner prescribed by law, but that the actually improved
or opened portion of the road was not more than thirty feet,
and that fence lines of abutting owners were erected accord-
ingly and so maintained for perhaps more than a century,
what rights have accrued or have been diminished? If, in
brief, the public once had a sixty-foot way over lands, can
that right or title be diminished by the encroachments of
abutting landowners?
2 Supra. n. 1, p. 216.
' Cf. Moore v. Schoppert. 22 W. ya. 282 (1883). where the court takes Judicial
notice of the incorporation of such turnpikes under legislative authority.
6 Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450, 19 At]. 858 (1890).
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EFFECT OF ENCROACHMENT IN GENERAL
One of the earliest and most instructive cases upon this
subject which the writer has examined, is that of Peckham v.
Henderson,5 decided in the year 1858. In 1806 the New
York legislature passed an act appointing commissioners to
lay out a road at least six rods wide through Genesee
County, and directing that a map of said road should be
duly recorded in the office of the County Clerk; and that
thereafter it should be lawful to improve and open the
highway. The survey filed was approximately one-half
mile south of the locus in quo of the road. In 1809 the high-
way was opened four rods wide. In 1815 it was re-surveyed
under an act of the legislature, and this survey was identi-
cal with that portion of the road passing through the plain-
tiff's property. The evidence showed that the road had
been used as early as 1817 and that the fence removed by
defendant was constructed in 1823, within the limits of the
six-rod way. The defendants attempted to remove this fence
without making compensation to the plaintiff. The court
stated the problem presented, as follows:
"The position of the defendants is that a highway was
lawfully laid out six rods wide in 1815; that the public
acquired a right to such a road, and that the plaintiff,
and those from whom he derived a title, have encroached
upon the highway ever since 1823; and that such en-
croachment may now be removed."
Counsel for defendants proceeded upon the theory that the
fence was a public nuisance and therefore could be abated,
regardless of how long such nuisance had been in existence.
To this the court replied:
"The counsel had assumed that the encroachment, so
claimed, was a public nuisance * * * * the very point to be
established before the principles, relating to the time of its
continuance, can be made applicable. What is a nuisance?
Blackstone (3 Com. 215) says, 'Nuisance, nocumentum, or
annoyance, signifies anything that worketh hurt, incon-
venience, or damage. And nuisances are of two kinds;
public or common nuisances, which affect the public and
are an annoyance to all the king's subjects, for which
reason we must refer them to the class of public wrongs,
' 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 2D7 (1858).
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or crimes and misdemeanors; and private nuisances may be
defined anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands,
tenements, or hereditaments of another.' * * * And of this
nature (public nuisances) are annoyances in highways,
bridges and public rivers, by rendering the same incon-
venient or dangerous to pass, either positively by actual
obstructions, or negatively by want of reparation * * * *
the annoyance or neglect must be of a real and substantial
nature."
Thus it is apparent that the court meant to distinguish be-
tween active nuisances such as obstructions, and passive
nuisances such as encroachments, which occasion no public
inconvenience or damage. However, it should be noted
that in this case there was involved a statute of limitations
which ran against the state, and that the plaintiff had been
in adverse possession of the enclosed portion of the road
for more than thirty years.
A most instructive case is that of Quinn v. Baage,0 decided
by the Iowa court in 1907. Upon the effect of encroach-
rents by an abutting landowner, the court said:
"Though the authorities are in conflict on the question,
this court is committed to the doctrine that in establishing
and maintaining a highway a municipality exercises gov-
ernmental functions, and for this reason the Statute of
Limitations does not run against it with respect to en-
croachment therein * * * *. But where the road has
been established and continually used, the mere fact that
the fences bordering it are not on the true line, and the
portion beyond has been occupied by the landowner up
to the fence, and not made use of by the public, will not
work an estoppel against the public, but the entire width
of the highway may be appropriated by the public when-
ever required for the purposes of travel * * * the fact
that the entire width has not been appropriated to such
use indicates no more than that in the opinion of the then
road officers all is not immediately necessary to meet the
demands of the traveling public."
While this excerpt shows that the court discusses the statute
of limitations, the doctrine of estoppel, and by implication
the doctrine of abandonment, it is clear that mere encroach-
ments upon a right of way not opened to the full width,
confer no rights upon the encroacher as against the public.
The case goes on to say:
138 Ia. 426, 114 N. W. 205 (1907).
5
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"The doctrine of acquiescence is founded on the pre-
sumption of an agreement fixing the division line from
long maintenance of a fence or other monument marking
a line as a boundary between the adjoining owners, and
this is of such strength that, after the lapse of ten years,
in the interest of peace and quiet, they are not permitted
to gainsay the agreement thus inferred."
But that in such a case, the doctrine of acquiescence is inap-
plicable, the court stated:
"As an official of the county or township is (not) auth-
orized to establish the line other than in its true location,
it follows that the public cannot be bound by such an
agreement, if made, or by acquiescence in a line erron-
eously treated as correct, no matter for how long a time."
The Quinn Case overruled the earlier Iowa decision of Axmeacr
v. Richards,7 and commented upon Davies v. Huebner." In
the latter case an adjoining landowner had erected a house
in the year 1846, within the sixty feet set apart for a high-
way. However, a total abandonment by the public was
shown. In discussing this phase of the question, the court
in the Quinn Case went on to say:
"Where the nonuser has continued for such a length of
time, and private rights of such character have been ac-
quired by long continued possession and consequent trans-
fer of lands by purchase and sales, justice demands the
public should be estopped from asserting the right to
open the highway. The first requisite to establish such
estoppel should be that the adverse possession should
continue for 10 years by analogy to the statute of limita-
tions. Then it should be shown that there has been a
total abandonment of the road for at least the period of
ten years."
Quinn v. Baage was cited with approval in Pine v. Reynolds,9
a later Iowa case decided in 1919. The same rules are enun-
ciated in Webb v. Butler County, 0 by the supreme court of
Kansas. There, the plaintiff's bill showed the authoriza-
tion and establishment of a forty-foot highway on his prem-
112 Ia. 667, 84 N. W 686 (1900).
46 Ia. 574 (1877).
o 187 Ia. 379, 174 N. W. 257 (1919). An instructive note to this case, discussing
the effect of encroachment in general is contained in 6 A. L. R. 1206.
10 52 Kan. 376, 34 Pac. 973 (1893).
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ises, in the year 1872, but the road was not actually traveled
the full width, and the plaintiff had been in possession up
to the traveled way for seventeen years at least. The court
held:
"Having been legally authorized, laid out, and used, it
is, in legal contemplation, a public highway. The fact
that the public may not use or travel over the full width
of such a highway will not operate to narrow it * * * *
such limited use will not lessen the right of the public
to use the entire width of the highway when the in-
creased travel and the exigencies of the public make it
necessary. It has been held that where an easement is
obtained by adverse use alone, the extent of the ease-
ment must be measured by the actual use; but this rule
has no application to a road of a certain width, authorized
and established in pursuance of statute."
Keeping in mind that in this discussion it has been assumed
at the outset that the ancient turnpikes in West Virginia
were established by legislative authority, and in accordance
therewith, sixty feet in width, it must be conceded that
whatever rights the public may now have in those high-
ways will be measured with reference thereto, and not with
reference to the actual extent of the user. The reasons in
support of this contention are well set-forth in the Maine
case of Pillsbury v. Brown," decided in 1890. There the de-
fendants acting in behalf of their town, widened a street in
front of the plaintiff's hotel. Plaintiff sued in trespass, and
the evidence showed that the street had been actually lo-
cated on the ground and that the plaintiff's grantor had the
lot surveyed with reference to such location. The court
said:
" * * * when an easement of any kind is obtained by ad-
verse use alone, its extent must be measured b'y its use.
But this rule does not apply to ways which have com-
menced under an actual and recorded location which
clearly and distinctly defines their width, though the pro-
ceedings may not have been in all particulars strictly
conformable to law. In such cases, the use is presumed
to be coextensive with the land purporting to have been
conveyed by it. This result is sometimes reached by the
presumption of a dedication, and sometimes by the pre-
sumption that the proceedings were all regular. In this
11 Suvra, n1. 4.
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state, the latter mode has been adopted * * * *. It is the
location de facto that by the lapse of time ripens into the
location de jure. To rest such a result on a presumption of
regularity is to rest it on a fiction; and to rest it on the
presumption of a dedication would be equally so. We
think it would be better to avoid these unnecessary fic-
tions, and let the result rest on a positive rule of law,
which, like all limitation laws, has the public good and
the public convenience for a foundation. The rule of law
is this: that after the lapse of 20 years, accompanied by
adverse use, a location de facto becomes a location de jure."
Having held that irregularity in the original proceedings
could not diminish the public right, the court went on to
say as follows:
"Where * * * * a tract 3 or 4 rods wide, such as is
usually laid out as a highway, has been used as a high-
way, although 20 or 30 feet only have been used as a
traveled path, still, this is such a use of the whole as coi-
stitutes evidence of the right of the public to use it for a
highway, by widening the traveled path, or otherwise,
as the increased travel and the exigencies of the public
may require * * * * we hold in this case that the public is
entitled to a way three rods wide, as originally laid out,
notwithstanding the wrought part of it, and the part ac-
tually used by travelers, may have been very much less
than that; and that the traveled path may from time to
time be widened or otherwise improved, as the growing
wants of the public may require, provided such improve-
ments are kept within the limits of the way as originally
laid out."
The principles enunciated in the foregoing cases, it is be-
lieved, are supported by the weight of authority in this
country,12 and it is submitted that as a bare proposition of
law, without regard to modifications by statute, it must be
said that where a highway is legally established and lo-
cated, but not actually used for the full width, abutting
landowners cannot, without more, acquire any portion of
the land within the limits of such way.
THE MICHIGAN RULE
It is now proposed, for the purposes of discussion, to ex-
See cases collated in 6 A. L. It. 1206. Also cf. County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97
Ill. 84 (1880) ; Hamilton v. State, 106 Ind. 361 (1886) Fox v. Hart, 11 Oh. 414 (1842) ;
Childs t. Nelson, 69 Wis. 125, 33 N. W. 587 (1887) ELLIOT, ROADS AND STEETs, 4th
ed., §441 and n., p. 504.
8
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amine the minority view, set forth by the supreme court of
Michigan, in several cases. In Lyle v. Leasia,18 the plaintiff
sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from plow-
ing and ditching on his premises, on that portion of the
latter which had been virtually abandoned for twelve years.
The defendants sought to show that the vacating of the
road was illegal because the records did not show that cer-
tain required notices had been given. But the court said:
" ** * ** the action of the commissioners has for 12 years
been accepted as valid by everyone concerned or inter-
ested in the premises, as well as by the public generally,
we do not think the public authorities can now be heard
to establish the illegality of their own proceedings in
order to acquire the lands of the complainant for public
use without compensation. Under their actions, in which
all have acquiesced, he has gone on and improved the
premises, and perhaps repurchased them, relying upon
the fact that the road was abandoned, as he bought the
land .ineA the discontinuance, of the highway. There is
no principle of equity that will sanction or sustain the
action of defendants in now seeking to rehabilitate this
extinct road with the life it may have once had by reason
of its user before its abandonment."
This would seem to be in accord with Davies v. Huebner,14
since, as said in that case, the two requisites to establish an
estoppel were adverse possession for ten years and a total
abandonment of the road; and it is upon that theory that the
cases can be reconciled. However, Coleman v. Railroad Com-
1pany,15 decided the same year, goes further. In that case, the
plaintiff sued for the value of a horse killed by the defend-
ant's cars. The railroad company maintained a fence at a
crossing on the highway, assuming the latter to be four rods
wide. But the plaintiff maintained his fence only fifteen
feet from the center of the highway, thus leaving a break or
gap between the two. The final question for decision re-
solved itself into this: within what limits was the defendant
bound to maintain a fence? The evidence disclosed that
the highway was laid out in 1832 and used for forty years,
and the plaintiff had maintained his fence fifteen feet from
the center of the way, for a period of thirty years. A further
13 64 Mich. 16, 81 N. W. 23 (1887).
14 Supra, n. 8.
64 1Mich. 160, 81 N. W. 47 (1887).
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consideration was that a statute adopted in 1881 made "all
highways that are or may become such (public highways)
by time and use, shall be four rods in width." The opinion
goes on to state:
"In this case the fact that the road was never 6pened
and worked by the authorities inside the line of the
plaintiff's fence, but outside of it; that the public use and
travel have also been outside of such fence, the plaintiff
for over thirty years cultivating and holding the premises
as his private property, and subject to no easement of the
public, * * * * is sufficient to rebut any presumption of
any donation * *** "
As to the effect of the statute, the court said:
"The legislature, in my opinion, in 1881, could not alter
or change the vested rights of the plaintiff in the prem-
ises. It would be taking the land of the plaintiff, with-
out compensation, for public use, and without his con-
sent."
That the court meant to establish a doctrine favorable to
encroaching landowners is shown by point two of the sylla-
bus, which is as follows:
"Where a highway, as used and worked for thirty
years, is less than 4 rods wide, and the owner of the ad-
joining land has used and occupied the land up to the
boundary of the road as used for that period, he acquires
title to the land up to that line, whether the road was regu-
larly laid out as a highway or became such by user,16 and the
true boundary of the road is the boundary of the land
used as such."
This is in effect, a doctrine of adverse possession as against
the public, or it may be considered as a theory of partial
abandonment by nonuser. Thus, as said by the court in
Gregory v. Knight,17 by way of dicta:
"It would be wrong and illegal to put a highway, as
against long possession, on any better footing than other
property. Highways may be wholly, and there is no
reason to hold they may not be partially, discontinued
by nonuser. It is the business of the authorities when
roads are laid out to take some pains to designate the
boundaries on the ground, and to have the lines visibly
defined. If this is not done, the mischief of unsettling
1 Italics writer's.
11 14 Mich. 700 (1883).
10
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what is generally accepted will be very great, and the
rights of parties, whether depending on surveys or pos-
session, will be protected by the ordinary courts of jus-
tice."
As would be supposed, however, the Michigan court holds
that these principles have no application to that part of the
vay which has been kept in use for public travel.18
We therefore perceive, as was said in Quinn v. Baage,0 a
-conflict in the authorities. Courts have, in holding to the
majority view, evidently been imbued with the notion that
there is a more or less mysterious sanctity in the "public
right." It is not difficult to reach such a conclusion by
relying upon such impeccable maxims as "Rex non potest
peccare." Yet, it is submitted, to hurl such quotations at the
rural West Virginian, in the year 1927, and explain that by
reason of legal necromancy, filtering through the ages, his
choice farmland is to be taken for a highway without com-
pensation, is to pile insult upon injury. And it is imma-
terial that the farmland may not be choice. The result is
the same; for the taking of the property is not the thing of
value; it is the infringement of the supposed legal right.
Such was once the view of our own supreme court.
THE WEST VIRGINIA DECISIONS
In City of Wheeling v. Campbell,20 the plaintiff applied for
an injunction to restrain the defendants from erecting a
building in the city street, which was shown to have been
laid out pursuant to an act of the Virginia Assembly and
surveyed as sixty-six feet wide. The defendants and their
grantors claimed to have held adversely since the year
1847, which was forty years prior to the institution of the
suit. The court was cognizant of the maxim "nullum tempus
occurit regi," but considered whether it should apply to munic-
ipal corporations, and said:
"Public corporations, as distinguished from private
corporations, are such as exist for public political pur-
poses only, such as counties, cities, towns, and villages
* *1 * * . But the reason which upholds the rule of
nullum tempus, etc., when applied to the sovereign, does not
1 Wayne County Bank v. Stockwell, 84 Mich. 586, 48 N. W. 174 (1891).
39 Supra, n. 6.
-0 12 W. Va. 36 (1877).
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in our opinion, excuse the laches of the officers of these
small communities. The plea of nullum tempus, etc., is as
before mentioned, one that peculiarly belongs to the sov-
ereign, or to the commonwealth, to be exercised for the
public good * ** * . The King, or State cannot be pre-
sumed to mean wrong, or to have an interest inconsistent
with justice. But these communities, like the individuals
who compose them, have no such legal presumption in
their favor."
At that time, the statute of limitations running against the
state, was worded thus: "Every statute of limitation, unless
otherwise expressly provided, shall apply to the State, but
as to claims heretofore accrued, the time shall be computed
as commencing when this chapter takes effect." As it now
reads, in Chapter 35, §20 of the Code, very little
change has been made. The present form of statute was
enacted on February 9, 1882, and has been held constitu-
tional.2 1 Perhaps the first intimation of a change in the
doctrine of City of Wheeling v. Campbell, was contained in
a dictum in Foley v. County Court.22 Judge Brannon, re-
ferring to a Georgia case, said:
" * * * * even where there is a statute making adverse
possession apply to the state, the statute is to be construed
as intended to apply only to such property as is held by
the state like an individual proprietor * * * *and as not
intended to apply to property held by the state for purely
'governmental purposes."
Continuing, Judge Brannon further said:
"A county or. town is not the state. The state does not
own a court house lot or street or road; indeed, I go
further and say that as to a highway neither the county
nor town owns it; nobody owns it; only that non-
corporate, indefinable 'public' owns it, if ownership any
where there is * * * *. The statute of limitations sup-
poses a right in one party to be made good by time, and a
right in another to be defeated by time. Who has the
right in a highway to be defeated by time? There is no
legal entity to which the statute can apply, no person
against whom it can run, no individual right."
No mention was made in the last-cited case, of Wheeling v.
Campbell. Apparently it was overlooked. The dictum of
" State v. Miines, 38 W. Va. 125 (1893).
54 W. Va. 16, 46 S. E. 246 (1903).
12
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Judge Brannon, as above quoted, will be of interest to stu-
dents of the law of titles to real property. In State v. Har-
man,23 it was held that the statute of limitations runs against
the State as to its land not used in governmental administra-
tion, i.e., "wild land." In State v. Mines, 24 our court held that
the provision of the Code of 1868, was not repealed by
Chapter 55, Section 19 of the Acts of 1875, which latter
provision was that "There shall be no limitation to pro-
ceedings on judgments on behalf of the State or any claim
due the State," but that the latter sinply took out of the
statute of limitations, judgments and money claims of the
state; and that when the said Act of 1875 was itself re-
pealed, such judgments and claims of the state were again
made subject to the statute of limitations.
For sixteen years, the doctrine of City of Wheeling v. Camp-
bell was the law of this state. But in 1899 it was overruled by
Ralston v. Town of Weston.2 5 Judge Dent, delivering the opin-
ion, stated: ......
"The case of City of Wheeling v. Campbell, while ably con-
sidered in following the supposed weight of authority, is
a plain and palpable misapplication of the statute of limi-
tations to the sovereign rights of the people. That the
statute of limitations applies to municipal corporations
there can be no question; * * * but it does not apply to
the sovereign rights of the people, except as they are re-
stricted in the constitution by their manifest will therein
contained. '26
The court did not state whether by "municipal corpora-
tions," it meant to include county courts, but such is not the
inference from the following:
" * * * we can well say that its highways are the only
property the people of West Virginia hold in their sover-
eign capacity, and in these every individual has the same
right, from the least to the greatest, and from which no
one, however weak or small or mean, can be excluded
**** . It matters not whether they be in the town or
country, the same protecting egis watches over them and
this is the sovereignty of the people. The public do not
hold the title in fee. It may be in the original owner,
.3 57 W. Va. 447, 50 S. E. 828 (1905).
24 Supira, n. 21.
' 46 W. Va. 644.
46 W. Va. 544, 547.
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the abutting lot owners, the municipality, or State, and
there it rests in abeyance as long as the land is needed by
the public, who hold only an easement therein." 27
It is submitted that the last phrase of the above quotation
is erroneous if meant to apply to turnpikes, in view of our
statute, of which more will be said later. The court went
on to argue that since the public had the right to take pri-
vate property for public use, the right to keep it inviolate
for the same use, should be coextensive. The doctrine of
public nuisances was discussed, but no such distinction was
made as in the New York case,2 between active and passive.
Our court said:
"If the easement is interfered with by an individual
while it is alive, such interference is a public nuisance,
and it matters not how long it is continued, it can never
destroy the easement; for it is under the ban of the law,
and subject to abatement at any time. * * * * Once a
nuisance, always a nuisance; once a highway, always a
highway, until legally discontinued, changed, or altered.
* * ** So it may be said of the county, so it may be said of
the State, and every public officer or agency; for they are
all merely trustees and servants of the people. 29
Returning to City of Wheeling v. Campbell, Judge Dent finally
said:
"The oversight in the learned JUDGE'S opinion, and
the numerous decisions on which he places his reliance,
is his failure to distinguish the municipality in its private,
ministerial, and local governmental capacities, from the
municipality in its higher governmental capacity as the
agent of the public, charged with the duty of preserving
the sovereign rights of the people. The municipality,
though it may own the fee, is not the owner of the public
easement in the land."
3 0
It is submitted that this is loose language. In one paragraph
the court speaks as if it meant that the particular govern-
mental ,agency held the fee, in trust, so to speak, for the
beneficial use of the general public. In another, it men-
tions easements, as apart from a trustee relationship. Cer-
tainly, it serves no purpose to be unduly insistent upon tech-
46 W. Va. 544, 548.
:3 Supra. n. 5.
46 W. Va. 544, 551. Itahffs writer's.
46 W. Va. 644, 552.
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nical points of law; but it seems equally certain that loose
language may often be the result of loose thinking, with a
consequent erroneous conclusion. And, it is submitted,
such conclusions are more apt to be reached when the court
of to-day applies the words of yesterday to the facts in
hand.
It would seem that the holding of the court required no
decision as to the applicability of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. However we find the following :31
"The cases of City of Wheeling v. Campbell, Forsyth v.
City of Wheeling, and Teasg v. City of St. Albans, in so far
as they hold that public easements in the public highways
can be destroyed by private individuals contrary to the
sovereign will of the people, are hereby disapproved as
erroneously propounding the law.
"Nor does the doctrine of estoppel apply in such cases.
[Citing cases.] The statute of limitations is a mere legal
estoppel, and, if not applying to legalize a public nui-
sance, neither does equitable estoppel; for equity follows
the law, and will grant no relief to a lawbreaker or
wrongdoer. Clean hands and a clear title are always
equitable requirements."
However, succeeding sentences seem to show that the court
was referring to cases in which there was a wilful attempt
upon the part of the landowner to acquire property which
he knew to be charged with the public easement. This is
illustrated by the following:
"There may arise cases of particular hardship, where,
through negligence or mistake of the public officers, valu-
able improvements, under a bona fide claim of right, may be
erected by the abutting lot owners, invading and destroy-
ing, without wrongful intent, the public easement in a
portion of the adjacent street. * * * * Such invasion is
sometimes slight in comparison with the improvements
made, and at other times it is much more serious. * * * *
To abate such structure as an ordinary nuisance would be
a tyrannical act of governmental power, which finds no
lodgement in the breasts of a free and just people. The
mistake having been mutual or occasioned by the negli-
gence of the public, and the property owner being free
from evil intent, the loss shoufd fall on the people, as
most able, to bear it, rather than on the individual, who
46 W. Va. 544. 554-555.
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may be rendered bankrupt if he must endure it."
It must be fairly admitted that here the court had in mind
an urban situation, and not one such as we have supposed
in this discussion. Quaere: Should the same principle apply?
Ralston v. Town of Weston has been approved in subsequent
decisions, and is seemingly the law of this state in so far as
it is applicable to similar states of fact. We now come to
a consideration of the effect of statutory enactments. Chap-
ter 39, Section 21 of the Code 32 provides that:
"The interest which belonged to the State on the first
day of July, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight
(whether as owner, or one of several owners, or a share-
holder or stockholder) in any road (including turnpikes
and plank roads) 3 3 * * * * lying wholly or in part within the
limits of a county, is transferred to and shall continue
vested in such county so far as such road, bridge, or pub-
lic landing is within said county; together with all the
rights and powers of the State pertaining thereto as such
owners * * * * "
Before discussing this, §23 of the same chapter should be
noted:
" * * * * And when any county acquires the interest of
the State, or any other stockholder in any road, bridge, or
public landing, under either of the two preceding sections,
the county court of such county shall have all powers,
rights, and privileges, perform all duties and be subject
to the same liabilities that were vested in, held, exercised
or required to be performed by or imposed upon the
State or other former stockholders therein."
If the county court thereby acquires the interest of the state,
or any other stockholder, it becomes pertinent to remember
that the ancient Virginia statute first referred to, enacted
that "the said road, with all the tolls and profits, shall be,
and the same is hereby vested in the respective proprietors
forever, in proportion to their respective shares; and the
same shall be deemed personal estate, and shall be exempt
from any public charge or tax whatsoever." Does then,
the county court have only personal estate by force of §23?
Certainly, by virtue thereof alone, it could not acquire
more than the former stockholders of a turnpike company had,
BARNES' W. VA. CODE, 1923.
13 Parentheses wlter's.
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which as we have shown is deemed to be personal property.
.But to argue that such a result would obtain, it is submitted,
is to put too great a strain upon words and logic. Surely
the Virginia Assembly in the year 1817, still imbued with
the common law of England, did not intend to revolution-
ize the law of real property. At least, they did not intend
so to alter it that the ancient and hallowed doctrines of ad-
verse possession, abandonment, and the like would be cast
aside, and to enact that in determining the legal rights per-
taining to a public highway, the courts should peer into
authorities upon the law of personal estate. But let us
have what light the decisions of the court throw upon the
statute. In Moore v. Schoppert, 4 it was said:
"This legislation, it seems to me, was intended to trans-
fer to the different counties the interest of the State in
the turnpike roads or parts of such roads, lying in the
respective counties and to confer upon the county courts
of such counties the control of the interests of the State
thus transferred to the respective counties, and also to
give the county courts control of such roads, or parts of
roads, as any county may by agreement, condemnation,
or otherwise, acquire * * * *, or of such roads as may
have been entirely abandoned by the corporation or pri-
vate stockholders."
However, even this statement does not purport to vest in the
counties more than the state or the turnpike corporation
had therein. But it seems that the court will take judicial
notice of that interest, whatever it may be. Witness the
following, quoted from the same case:
"While the record does not show any interest in the
county, it may be assumed the court judicially knows
that, by the policy adopted by the State of Virginia and
which was carried on when said road was constructed,
the said State, for the encouragement of internal im-
provements and the development of the State, made lib-
eral subscriptions to the capital stock of almost every
company incorporated by it for works of internal im-
provement and especially companies incorporated for the
construction of turnpike roads."
But it is perhaps useless to cite cases and quote from de-
cisions further. From the foregoing, several conclusions
9, 22 W. Va. 282 (1888).
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would seem to be justified: That the turnpike corporations,
proceeding under the old Virginia statute, acquired a fee
simple to sbty feet of land all along the location of their
roads; at least something greater than an easement. That
such interest in fee, is now vested in the respective county
courts of those counties through which the ancient road
passed. That such interest has, from the moment of its
creation, been held subject to the public right. If so, how
can an adjoining landowner, or group of landowners, ac-
quire a portion of that fee, and thereby a portion of the
public right? We have seen that the majority of courts
refuse to permit an acquisition by the landowner under the
doctrine of adverse possession. Likewise under the doctrine
of abandonment, unless such abandonment be total. Like-
wise as to the theory of acquiescence, upon the ground that
there is no legal entity authorized to acquiesce on behalf of
the public. As to estoppel, the landowner finds more en-
couragement.5
No attempt has been made in this discussion to argue
upon either side of the question. But the points here raised,
it is submitted, will at some time, necessarily be determined
by our court. The problem for every lawyer involved in
such a case will be, of course, what is the law? An histori-
cal and mechanical jurisprudence would seem to reply in
favor of the public right to claim the entire sixty feet. But
a sociological jurisprudence may take into account the re-
sult to be reached. In the final analysis, which is the more
socially desirable result: that the state or county should
build roads and in doing so, take what for scores of years
has been considered by the public in general as private
property; or that a fair compensation should be made to
bona fide purchasers of property, who have been lulled into
security by the negligence and ignorance of the public offi-
cials? Another distinction should be noted. That is, that
the very great mass, if not indeed all, of the decisions of
the courts, both in this and in other states, involving the
rights of abutting landowners, have been cases of isolated
or individual encroachment. Should it make a difference
0 Recent West Virginia cases pertinent to the entire subject are State v. Road
Commission, 96 W. Va. 184, 122 S. E. 627 (1924) ; County Court v. Hamlett, et at., 01
W. Va. 678, 133 S. E. 388 (1926).
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in the rule when not one, or two, or six landowners have
encroached, but hundreds? This is a small. "public" in
itself. True, a thousand trespasses or nuisances could not
render one legal. But the number may be important upon
the question of abandonment, which, after all is a question
of intention. In the face of such preponderant evidence,
could it not be construed as evincing an intention upon the
part of the public, through its officials, to abandon fifteen
feet on each side of the ancient turnpikes? And, as said
by the Michigan court,8" if there can be a total abandon-
ment, no reason is perceived why there cannot be a partial
abandonment. It is a novel proposition that the parts may
be greater than the whole.
Upon the other hand, the admitted advantages which
accrue to landowners when a highway is improved by the
public authorities, almost always confer a benefit greater
in value than the market value of the land taken, plus
damages to the residue. Admitting that these are "general
benefits" which would be disregarded in a condemnation
proceeding, still it is submitted that the court might proper-
ly take them into consideration if it attempted to apply the
doctrine of equitable estoppel. Upon the whole question,
we may reach opposite conclusions, depending upon whether
we regard the law as that which is contained in reported
decisions, or with Mr. Justice Holmes, only a prophecy of
what the courts will do in fact.
28 Supra, n. 17.
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